



Democratic Fatigue in Indonesia: The Anomaly of Jokowi's Approval Rating Amidst Democratic Regression

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| ARTICLE INFORMATION | A B S T R A C T |
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| <p>Received: June 12, 2024 Revised: September 25, 2024 Available online: October 31, 2024</p> | <p>Drawing insights from the evolution of political discourse in Indonesia since the reformation era, it becomes evident that democracy plays a pivotal role in underpinning the continuity of national leadership. The quality of democracy stands as a decisive factor in shaping public endorsement towards leaders. As the quality of democracy diminishes during a leader's tenure, the likelihood of rejection by the populace amplifies. However, an anomaly surfaces when assessing the leadership tenure of Jokowi. Despite a regression in democratic standards under his stewardship, Jokowi garnered a remarkably high approval rating. This article endeavors to elucidate this anomaly through the lens of psychoanalysis. Departing from prevailing research contentions that perceive media techniques as instrumental in augmenting approval ratings through hegemonic manipulation, this study delves into probing why the public places trust in the media as a hegemonic instrument. Employing qualitative methodologies and grounded within an interpretive framework utilizing secondary sources, this article asserts that the Indonesian public, afflicted by trauma and disillusionment towards democracy, gravitates towards objects of desire imbued with non-democratic values. It posits that fluctuations in approval ratings are not contingent upon the quality of democracy but are rather influenced by the efficacy of power in navigating desires and meeting the needs that ensure subject stability. Within this discourse, the democratic regression witnessed during Jokowi's tenure seemingly succeeded in assuaging the populace's anxieties regarding their sense of completeness, encompassing uncertainties, the dearth of political party representation, identity crises, and leadership presence. Consequently, this phenomenon not only engenders satisfaction among the populace but also fosters acceptance of Jokowi's presidential actions and policies, thereby bolstering his political stature.</p> |
| <p>KEYWORDS</p> <p>Democracy; Regression; Approval; Leadership; Hegemony</p> | |
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INTRODUCTION

Joko Widodo, the 7th president of Indonesia, has faced considerable criticism for being held responsible for the decline in the quality of democracy in Indonesia (Hadiz, 2021). Joko Widodo or Jokowi, the 7th president of Indonesia, is still considered an important and very determining factor in the political constellation in Indonesia (Nainggolan, 2023). The importance of Jokowi's figure here is not only seen simply because he currently occupies the position of President and has authority over many state institutions, but because his figure is still liked and accepted by the public. This is reflected in Jokowi's high approval rating in almost all survey institutions. Unlike previous Indonesian presidents who became lame ducks toward the end of their terms. Lame duck here refers to the capacity of a political leader who is experiencing a period of "decline" because he is at the end of his term of office (Quillen, 2009). For example, SBY, in 2013, or one year before the end of his presidential term, only had an approval rating of 40.5%. Meanwhile, Jokowi at the end of his leadership period, according to several survey institutions such as Kompas Research and Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Political Indicators, still had a fairly high approval rating of 74.3% (Kompas 2023), while CSIS 75% (CSIS 2023), and Indikator Politik reached 78.4% (Indikator Politik 2023).

Approval rating Nicholson et al., (2002), indicator that shows the extent to which a government is supported and approved by the community/public. Approval ratings are different from public satisfaction indicators. The public satisfaction indicator measures the level of public satisfaction with the President, Governor, Regent/Mayor with certain/specific policies and public services (OECD, 2023).

Assessment of public satisfaction is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of a program and understanding the needs needed to improve the program/policy. Meanwhile, the approval rating is a tool that measures the level of public approval or support for a President, Governor and Regent/Mayor. The assessment is centered on the individual's overall performance. The aim is to describe the leader's popularity and its influence on political winning strategies. The higher the approval rating for a figure, the greater the possibility that the figure will be approved and supported by the public for the decisions that will be taken.

Jokowi's high approval rating has become a key reason why political forces are competing for his endorsement, aiming to help candidates win political contests to get the endorsement of the figure who leads the government with the aim of helping candidates win political contests (Mustakim, 2023). In the Indonesian context, this figure is materialized in the figure of Jokowi. With a high approval rating, he is seen as a significant figure who can help win the 2024 presidential election contest. It is assumed from this approval rating that the public will support Jokowi's future steps, including his endorsement of a presidential candidate, including determining who he will support in the presidential election contest. That is why there are presidential candidates who are trying to bring their self-identification and affiliation closer to Jokowi, in the hope that this strategy will have an impact on electoral benefits on election day.

Different from the way political elites read the approval rating level as a basis for determining strategic political steps, this research wants to read Jokowi's high approval rating number as an anomaly: Why does the approval rating for Jokowi remain high, considering the many unpopular policies, especially towards democracy. While led by Jokowi, democracy in

Indonesia experienced a stagnant condition and even entered (Warburton, 2016).

This (Jokowi's high approval rating amidst democratic regression) is an anomaly because, when Indonesia entered the reform era, the most developed discourse in Indonesian political dynamics was democracy. There is evidence that national leaders who have problems with democracy will encounter problems that are protracted and have huge impacts. This is reflected in the public resistance to BJ Habibie, who, despite his success in opening the taps of democracy, demands for him to resign remain strong, one of the reasons being that Habibie is considered to be part of the undemocratic Orde baru regime (Harold, 2010), then Gus Dur, who was also considered undemocratic because he planned to issue a decree because he showed authoritarian behavior (Purba, 2023). Likewise, Megawati Soekarno Putri, who was considered unsuccessful in executing her program, was defeated in the democratic arena in the 2004 elections; as well as SBY's influence dropping drastically (Baker, 2014), experiencing a lame duck at the end of his second term in line with rumors of corruption (which was the main issue of democratization in the reform era) that surrounded the Democratic party - the party he led, not only that, SBY's popularity is increasingly declining due to SBY's indecisiveness as President in the direct/indirect regional election discourse (Baker, 2014). The momentum of declining public acceptance of SBY had a direct impact on a new figure on the national political scene, namely Joko Widodo. Joko Widodo is believed to be a figure who will improve Indonesian democracy.

However, all of Indonesia's democratic hopes and aspirations with Jokowi turned out to have a number of problems. After achieving victory in the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi's next test was to form a government, who is ready to execute the programs he will launch. Jokowi's vision and mission during the campaign were clear, he had an important document called "Nawa Cita" (Soleman & Noer, 2014), this document was accompanied by the slogan "Mental Revolution" (Kuwado, 2014), to complement the ideas brought by Jokowi. To translate the contents of the Nawa Cita document and this mental revolution into a more practical realm, Jokowi needs to translate it into a work program, which will later be compiled into regulations in law. However, this is exactly where the problem comes to the fore: the ideal ideas imagined by Jokowi meet complex political realities. This reality encouraged Jokowi to take compromise and interventionist steps to carry out his mission. One of the impacts of changing strategy is that it reduces the quality of democracy.

To achieve political stability, President Joko Widodo adopted a different approach. One of these strategies involved integrating opposition political parties into the government by attracting their members into the cabinet, thereby increasing their representation and overcoming political gridlock. Consequently, the percentage of seats supporting Jokowi's government in the DPR rose from 40% in 2014, comprising PDI-P, Nasdem, Hanura, and PKB, to 61% in 2016 with the inclusion of PPP, PAN, and the Golkar (Farisa and Fitria, 2019). This shift enhanced the political power base in parliament.

However, consolidating political power in this manner required significant compromises. To sustain these efforts and maintain political stability, President Joko Widodo had to modify and adapt many of his initial ideas and policies Warburton (2016), to align with his vision and mission. Tom Power, in his writing in *New Mandala* (2018), describes Jokowi's elite consolidation as significantly transforming his authority. Through this process, Jokowi's position strengthened, and he

began to show greater confidence in the majority's political support. Not only consolidating political power, Jokowi even succeeded in expanding his power base by accommodating the interests of the military and police to strengthen his power.

The impact of this political consolidation was to abandon ideas related to improvements to democratic institutions - precisely because improvements to the democratic project would disrupt the political stability that had been built. This caused democratic conditions in the Jokowi era to experience stagnation, even regression (Hadiz, 2021). Research results released by Freedom House and the Economic Intelligence Unit show that Indonesia's democracy index has fallen from year to year since Jokowi became president. Freedom House (2023), which since the 2003-2014 period included Indonesia in the Free country category, has since 2014 until now changed its status to Partly Free. Indonesia even touched its lowest ranking in 2019-2020, which made it the worst ranking for the quality of Indonesia's democracy since entering the reform era. In direct contrast to Freedom House's findings, the assessment of Indonesian democracy by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) also shows indications of serious setbacks. Indonesia, which from 2004 to 2014 was categorized by the EIU as a full democracy country, corrected this category to become a flawed democracy in 2014 to 2022 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2023).

One of the most explicit indicators in relation to the decline in the democratic quality index is: (1). Excessive use of ITE laws regarding defamation. Amnesty International (2023), stated that the ITE Law is the main cause of the narrowing of space for civil society; (2). Revision of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) law in 2019. Through this law, key features of the KPK were removed, and several of its members were dismissed. As a result, according to the Corruption Perception Index, the corruption perception score in Indonesia has the same fate as the declining democracy index by only occupying 102nd position out of 180 countries studied, this figure being Indonesia's lowest ranking since 2014 (Annur, 2023); (3). Implementation of the Omnibus Law to simplify legal provisions which will make the investment process easier (Wardana, 2020). This law then received criticism and condemnation from the public because it not only contained a number of problems in terms of substance, but also had procedural problems. This was revealed when the Constitutional Court (MK) annulled the law, and deemed it unconstitutional; (4). Widespread land conflicts involving communities against government officials (Widi et al., 2024).

When examining historical political events, it is common to observe that national leaders often experience a decline in electability when facing challenges related to democracy. However, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has experienced the opposite effect. Despite indications of declining democratic performance in various aspects, Jokowi has maintained a high approval rating. This anomalous situation raises the question: Why does Jokowi's approval rating remain high despite the perceived erosion of democratic standards?

METHOD

This article is classified as 're-interpretative' in nature. It aims to re-interpret the concept of Approval Rating, which has traditionally been recognized and utilized as a basis for executing non-democratic political actions. The research endeavors to provide a new, more critical interpretation of the concept of Approval Rating by highlighting the discrepancy between the accepted beliefs and the actual reality, and by exploring how the

process of subjectification—what Mark Bracher refers to as the interpellation of subjects by power—can bridge this gap. The methodological framework employed is Hermeneutics, as conceptualized by Paul Ricoeur. This approach involves interpreting meaning through two systems (Hardiman (2017); (1) the recovery of meaning, as in demythologizing, and; (2) iconoclasm or demystification, concepts advanced by thinkers like Marx, Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.

This thesis will employ qualitative methods, designed to explore and understand the 'meaning' behind the research object. Qualitative research seeks to investigate a phenomenon through a process involving the formulation of questions, the use of specific procedures, and the collection of detailed data to interpret the phenomena encountered (Creswell, 2019).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This research uses hegemony theory and psychoanalysis. Hegemony theory was popularized by Gramsci (1992), in his book *Prison Notebooks*, and then the theoretical framework of this book was explained more articulately and systematically in various books on social and political matters. Here, the author will refer a lot to Simon (2015), entitled 'Gramsci's Political Thought'. Simon (2015), explains hegemony as an unequal relationship which has implications for the domination of a social class over other social classes. This domination is not achieved through violence, but rather a combination of coercion and persuasion to gain approval through political leadership and ideology. Gramsci often uses the term *direzione* (leadership/direction) interchangeably with *egemonia* (hegemony) and this is different from *dominazione* (Simon, 2015). *Egemonia* has a soft, non-forceful nature, and we often don't realize that we are not actually being dominated/dominated. While *dominazione*, takes place sporadically, is constantly about controlling one power to control the weak.

Through this explanation, Gramsci wants to express that hegemony will control reality based on the criteria desired by power and will sort it out through coercive and persuasive apparatuses - or what Louis Althusser (Suryajaya, 2015), calls Repressive State Apparatuses. state (RSA) and Ideologies State Apparatuses/state ideological apparatus (ISA).

Beside that, Psychoanalysis posits that the subject is always caught within the dichotomy of objective right and wrong (Lacan and Jacques, 1998). The subject's mode of consciousness is not divided into dualities (right and wrong) which negate each other in objective reality. The reason for the failure to sort out right from wrong is not because the subject does not have the will to seek the ultimate truth, but rather, because the ontological status of the subject is lacking or hollow. Because it is ontological, existentially, the subject only exists if and only if it inherently has 'lack', and because it lacks, then the subject will continuously desire the object causing desire (OPH)/object petit a, in the framework of the 'process of becoming subject formulated in $\$$ notation. However, the urge to become a complete subject will always fail, instead of bridging the subject to the object of his desire, the process of fulfilling the subject will always miss the mark, and will always revolve around that object. This is why psychoanalysis is also often referred to as an ontology of finitude (Zizek et al., 2020), which in turn will make the subject always fail/miss in searching for absolute and objective truth.

Campaigns Through Buzzers and Digital Repression to Hegemony Strategy

It has been mentioned above that the subject of psychoanalysis is *homo desiderate*, a creature of desire because internally the subject has shortcomings. So, what triggers/stimulates the subject to have a Desire-Causing Object (OPH-object petit a)? According to Zizek et al., (2020), the subject's desires always arise from other desires through a symbolic order. The others here are subjects outside the 'self', which always give rise to the object that causes desire for the subject. The subject's desires are always conditioned by the symbolic order (through the symbolic apparatus - RSA/ISA). To bind the subject, others and this symbolic order, psychoanalysis has another concept, namely symptom. Symptoms are realities that we can detect every day, as an entry point to operationalizing psychoanalysis. In the research context, the symptom is that the subject desires Jokowi's figure in the midst of democratic regression.

Before discussing the topic of discussion further, it is important to understand this explanation, by looking at our daily desire scheme: When the subject is craving (desiring) an object called "Iphone". According to psychoanalysis, our desire for the iPhone never originates from the iPhone itself—as a material object. But rather the result of a media fabrication that is currently working to sell iPhones. Here, the media appears as the other, which navigates/directs what provokes desire and what does not.

In the context of Jokowi's approval rating, the role of the media as the other plays a very important role in the process of forming a symbolic order and directing the desires of the subject. This is in line with Herman & Chomsky (2012), explanation regarding manufactured consent, namely the creation of a symbolic/hegemonic order (Simon, 2015), through the media, and transforming the values of this symbolic order into a mechanism for forming public approval for the policies that Jokowi will take. Rakhmani & Saraswati (2021), even argues that the methods taken by elites in Indonesia (including Jokowi) to gain and maintain their power tend to mobilize the public through narratives that are no longer carried out persuasively, but rather using coercive/coercive methods.

The Manufactured Consent that Chomsky previously envisioned in relation to the use of media took place persuasively and seductively/seduced/asked for people's approval when executing certain policies. With Jokowi, Rakhmani & Saraswati (2021), method used was much more direct than imagined by Chomsky. To carry out his plan, Jokowi used a buzzer to enter and infiltrate private applications (Whatsapp) and insert Jokowi's ideas into them. Usually, political elites will employ a number of people to assemble symbolic narratives, disseminate them and even conflict to "force" the public to believe/agree with the political steps that have been and will be taken.

In the Jokowi government aside from being tasked with 'defensive' duties, such as image purification, buzzers also carried out 'aggressive' duties against parties critical of Jokowi, by promoting narrative content that portrayed a positive image. These ideas were produced simultaneously and simultaneously, with the aim that the policies that have been and will be executed by Jokowi must be accepted because "Jokowi is a good person". Not only that, this narrative also builds public opinion that the failures of the Jokowi government, for example, in terms of corruption, crime, problems with taxes and elites in government,

are not the result of Jokowi's fault, but of the people involved around him (Abbiyyu & Nindyaswari, 2022).

This symbolic order allows Jokowi as president to always be able to disengage from the main target of every policy he executes. The buzzer here is Jokowi's tool on social media to win/lead public opinion (Sastramidjaja, 2022), so that the public continues to accept Jokowi and the policies during his administration. Another reason that can be used to strengthen the argument for forcing consent through the media by Jokowi can also be explained by the way Jokowi's government represses cyber/digital life in Indonesia (Ufen, 2024). This has been successfully done since Article 27 paragraphs 1 to 4 of the ITE Law emerged as a cyberspace regulatory issue. Through this law, the Jokowi government can carry out monitoring functions, censorship functions and even turn off the internet network. Center for Digital Society (2023), through this scheme, Jokowi can better monitor and control the topic of conversation and change negative things into positive ones. To further facilitate subsequent actions, Jokowi appointed the head of his supporting volunteers (Pro-Jo/Pro Jokowi) Budi Arie Setiadi as Minister of Communication and Information. This series of political activities was carried out to obtain a positive image and form public approval and agreement, whose aim was not only to gain and maintain power, but to be able to reproduce power using relatives, close friends and even former political rivals (Abbiyyu & Nindyaswari, 2022; Rakhmani & Saraswati, 2021; Ufen, 2024).

Mobilizing the media for hegemonic purposes and creating a symbolic order is one thing, however, the public 'accepting' that order is another story. The discussion regarding the use of media as a tool to form public agreement can be explained in more depth in discourse analysis (Tomšič & Zevnik, 2016). In psychoanalysis, the discussion that needs to be taken further seriously is why the subject desires a symbolic order that reduces the quality of democracy? What factors encourage subjects to desire discourse that leads to the decline of democracy rather than advancing democracy, for example?

Reformasi has Become Uncanny even Weird

The democracy that exists in Indonesia today is a result of the 1998 Reformasi era struggle, which brought down the authoritarian Orde Baru regime. As a symbolic order, the orde baru did what every regime does, enforcing ideology whose aim is to subjugate and enclose subjects in the symbolic order. Ideology here is not ideology in the sense of big ideas such as Communism, Liberalism and Fascism, but ideology which in Marx's sense is called false consciousness: 'Ideology is false consciousness' (Eyerman, 1981). Ideology here is an image/projection of reality that is realized or not, considered to be true without first finding out the truth and people simply accept this projection/image of reality (Suryajaya, 2015). As the only single entity that holds power, it allows the order to do anything (through the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) to regulate the actions, perceptions and even thoughts of the subject (by providing any answer to the subject). Orde Baru just using big narratives such as unity, nationality, stability and national interests or anything that can create a fundamental fantasy (orde baru is this fundamental fantasy that allows the object (the orde baru) to have a desire value that drives the subject to defend it desperately. We can identify the symptoms of this narrative from the fusion of political parties, the mainstreaming of Nationalism discourse, the deployment of Pancasila as a single principle, and the implementation. Outline of State Policy (State) and

implementation of Pancasila Guidelines, Appreciation and Experience (P4).

Orde baru constructs or imagined scenarios, which can control, direct the subject to other desires, and provide certainty to the subject's question: "what do you want?". Unfortunately, no single object of desire is able to consistently meet the subject's expectations. The ontological status of a subject which is constitutively lacking (\$) will continuously desire and strive for that fullness. Along the way, the orde baru failed to fully fulfill the desires of the subjects. Subjects who continue to ask, investigate and find out what can make themselves stable and full, something that is no longer able to be answered by the orde baru which is also internally experiencing a commotion/crack internally with various problems of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, economic recession, and inflation. As a result of defects in the symbolic order, the orde baru lost the status of the object of desire (OPH/object petit a) and by implication, the orde baru as a symbolic order collapsed and lost the foundation of power. This is where the subject desires a orde baru which is expected to provide something else or an alternative Thing, which can satisfy the subject's desires. At that time, the subject viewed democracy and openness as an order that had an object that caused new desires, which promised freedom and openness for the subject to be able to explore desires in order to compensate for his shortcomings to become a complete, stable and full subject as a subject (S). This desire to rebel was then expressed in a political event/"event qua action" called reformation.

Reformasi is a symptom of the explosion of desires of subjects who desire freedom (Setiawan, 2018), subjects who succeeded in transcending the symbolic order and executing alternative ideas which for 32 years were closed/controlled by the grand narrative of unity, national interests (state oriented) by the new order. In this era, diversity of identities is celebrated, subjects find pleasure from identities that, during the New Order's reign, were subordinated. The post-reform government brought a spirit of freedom and openness both at the political and cultural levels, ideas that were completely different from what was implemented by the previous bar order.

Indonesia began opening access to press freedom (Poti et al., 2021), carry out political reform/development (Alfian, 1986), implement regional decentralization/autonomy (Khoirudin, 2005), hold direct elections for regional heads, carry out liberalization in several economic fields, and so forth. From these policies, we can indicate how the subject is immersed in the enjoyment of primordial/particular identities to fill the inherent emptiness within him. From this freedom, the public begins to recognize cultural expressions, knowledge, ideas and even religions that have not been represented in state administrative arrangements. In short, in the reform era, Indonesia, which since the orde baru was enveloped in a universal identity of nationhood, began to embrace a broader range of cultural, religious, and ideological expressions.

With Indonesia's history of the struggle for democracy, why did Jokowi not face fierce resistance when the country experienced a decline in democracy during his leadership? Moreover, why does Jokowi have such a high approval rating despite this decline? To understand this anomaly psychoanalytically, researchers will start by discussing a journalistic report from Farooq (2010), entitled "An Unstable and Less Liberal Global Middle Class". Journalistic reports observing China, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, India, Indonesia and other developing countries show the tendency of society towards

political conservatism instead of becoming more liberal. This journalistic report describes the middle class which has experienced significant development along with economic democratization, preferring strong 'strongmen' to lead political positions. They will voluntarily sacrifice the freedom they have, become very individualistic, apolitical, closed, uphold nationalistic values, and so on. This finding is surprising, because globally, the development of democracy (wave of democratization) in the world has been experiencing spring since the early 2000s, around 24 years ago.

This journalism report enriches the insight of what Helmke & Levitsky (2004), wrote about the death of democracy. If Levitsky and Ziblatt discuss the decline of democracy in terms of elite behavior, through Faroohar's report (Faroohar, 2010), we can understand that the elite's actions are not opposed and are actually accepted by the public, which apparently does not consider democracy as something important and crucial to maintain.

So, why does this happen? Why is it that the design of democracy, which allows society to actualize its freedom, actually takes the initiative to close down, and even allow political leaders to act excessively on their freedom? In other parts of the world, as explained by Torcal & Montero (2006), democracy on the one hand produces freedom, but on the other hand it has an impact on uncertainty, creating excesses of extreme groups that are not accommodated in democratization, in the United States, The subprime mortgage crisis occurred OCBC (2023), which created a feeling of widespread anxiety and made people strange and unfamiliar with the democracy they had previously hoped for. A series of events and the anxieties that arise stimulate the subject to desire something else, namely protection. This is reflected in the public's reasons in Faroohar (2010), that they want a strong government/strong people to secure wealth: "[...] experts at Pew and elsewhere say they are often willing to sacrifice those ideals for prosperity. Newly unfettered from poverty, they are also unwilling to take on much political risk. Democracy, which was initially hoped to provide many things (sublime objects), turns out to be lost and in this context, it is possible that democratic ideas are not considered relevant in satisfying the subject's desires.

In Indonesia, the study of reform in a passionate mode was discussed by Setiawan. According to Setiawan (2018), it is true that the reform event in May 1998 is interpreted as a radical act of the subject breaking away from established symbolic structures, in order to obtain an object of desire that promises fulfillment/stability for the subject, in pursuit of freedom, democracy, and the establishment of new institutions that are the opposite of the new order. However, according to Setiawan, when reform is successfully achieved, the subject does not get what is the object of desire - which is the reason why reform needs to be carried out. The reform was achieved, but then the subjects felt strange. This strange feeling arises from the blurring of the object that causes desire into a sublime object - something that was previously familiar and wanted to embrace, suddenly becomes strange and completely different. This feeling indicates that the subject never truly finds what is the object of his desire when yearning for reform. After reform was successfully achieved, the object that caused the desire to change shape became a sublime object that simply disappeared. Attempts to investigate these sublime objects are not absent. Every year during the month of May, Indonesia will commemorate this month as the month of reform.

In those months, activists were asked to reflect on what "achievements" were expected from the 1998 reforms--and then how those achievements would be evaluated today. However, the more reflection there is, and the more commentators attempt to discuss the meaning of reform, the less we find clarity regarding the sublime object. What happened, according to Setiawan, were actually excesses that the subjects did not imagine when they aspired to reform/democracy: more and more criminal acts of corruption, arbitrary behavior by elites, increasing crime rates, high uncertainty and other excesses that were not expected by subject. This reality, apart from separating the subject and its sublime object which makes the subject feel strange and unfamiliar, also produces 'trauma' and fatigue towards democracy for the subject, which makes the subject long for the unity of the subject and the symbolic order that can be achieved. bridging the subject with OPH.

Formation of Jokowi's Ideal Subjectivity Through National (Stability) Based Development

It must be acknowledged that reform and democratization contribute to the subject's search for sublime objects, which provide a sense of stability in the process of self-fulfillment.. But the fact that the subject is condemned to continue to desire and unremittingly pursue sublime objects goes beyond the discourse that reform commentators develop every year. The subjects again failed to identify democracy as a love of object and then desired something else, different which in Faroohar's report was shown to be increasingly conservative in politics.

In Indonesia, Jokowi's change in strengthening his leadership and government was by reorienting development which was anchored in state ideology (Warburton, 2016). Despite carrying out deregulation and debureaucratization policies, on the other hand, Jokowi's development also has 'nationalist' characteristics, with him naming development as a National Strategic Project (PSN). Symptoms can be seen from Jokowi's efforts to take over decisions that have so far been untouched by the state. Jokowi is expanding the role of the state, especially to foreign companies that have long been exploring nature in Indonesia to generate more profits for Indonesia. He also gave greater authority to state-owned companies, then thought about the added value of national industrial output by controlling downstreaming as a way to obtain greater profits for the national interest.

This style of development based on a nationalist orientation. This nationalist-oriented development style succeeded in shaping Jokowi's image as a strong and firm leader, rather than humanist and democratic like when he first became President in 2014 (Brinsmead, 2019). To make this development project smooth, Jokowi needs national stability. To make this happen, he had to suspend political development, institutionalization, and democratization efforts, as well as law enforcement, and reduce political conflicts. As a result, he sacrificed freedom and repressed resistance from civil society or anyone who could hinder the development projects he planned. In line with Faroohar, Jokowi's actions to reduce the level of democracy were not met with massive resistance from the public.

This was actually welcomed positively by the Indonesian people who were tired of democracy. Jokowi's high approval rating in the midst of democratic regression shows that the public/society actually desires strong leadership, and the subject gets the stability needed to fill the void (even if temporarily) and get Jouissance/enjoyment/pleasure for the subject. Once again, when a subject makes a decision to choose democracy or not, to

like Jokowi or not, it is always based on the subject's interests in meeting the subject's existence/stability needs (Zizek et al., 2020). And the reality of Jokowi's approval rating when the quality of democracy experienced a decline during his reign is that it illustrates that subjects who have experienced strangeness/fatigue towards democracy since the reform era no longer desire democracy in the context of existential fulfillment, such as during reform - subjects turned away and desired the type of strong leadership that the subject assume will bridge the subject to all existential questions and provide stability to the subject.

Non-ideology of Political Parties and Strengthening the Role of Individuals/Elites

After reformasi and democratization in Indonesia, changes also occurred within political parties. In this period, political parties which previously only consisted of 2 political parties and 1 political organization (Liddle, 1992), became 24 political parties. As a result, democracy in Indonesia at first glance looks lively, especially if we look at the number of political party participation. However, what needs to be observed in the development of democracy is the absence of efforts by political parties to implement ideas according to the ideology they adhere to.

This political reality was discovered by Aspinall (2018), when trying to outline a spectrum map of political parties in Indonesia. As a result, there are no significant ideological divisions between political parties in Indonesia. All political parties studied claim to be pluralist in carrying out their political activities, as well as policies towards the poor, women's emancipation, pro reform or returning to the new order, all political parties consistently have the same attitude which is then reflected in their vision. -mission of each political party.

Liddle (1992), believes that the weakening of political party institutions indirectly encourages Indonesian people to make political decisions based on interest in actors/figures. The subject, who is condemned to continue to desire, has only two material objects that can be desired to fill the void: political parties and political actors. As previously mentioned, it has been explained how all political parties start from the same starting point in carrying out their respective political activities - this is inversely proportional to the subject's desire for anything to achieve the fullness of its existence. This differs from political figures, who have diverse value systems and approaches that trigger the subject to develop 'belief' in their desire for these figures. This is why the subject stopped desiring political parties and shifted to desiring political figures.

In Indonesia, society's attachment to individuals/roles of figures is recorded in the history of the struggle calls which Ratu Adil (Sindhunata, 2024). In his dissertation work entitled "offen auf den Ratu-Adil: das eschalogische Motiv des "Gerechten Königs" im Bauernprotest auf Java während" Sindhunata wrote his observations regarding the struggles of the Dutch East Indies community at that time, relying on the strength of a figure, who was considered capable of capturing the problem real and maintain the hopes of many people. According to Sindhunata (2024), this hope is based on current disappointments, whether due to being treated unfairly, blasphemy and the increasingly severe poverty of life, as well as other failures that have completely eliminated people's hopes. Under these conditions, the presence of a figure who is able to overcome all existing problems is greatly missed, and if this figure is deemed to appear,

then society, along with the struggles they will undertake, will be very dependent on this figure/figures, to solve the problems. existing, and creating justice. This is why belief in a figure is considered as belief in Ratu Adil, or also often referred to as Satria Piningit (Anas, 2014).

If there is a common thread that can stitch together and find common problems in this research regarding Ratu Adil/Katria Piningit In the context of contemporary democracy as explained above, the discourse regarding Ratu Adil/Satria Piningit is always based on the failure of formal political institutions such as political parties in aggregating, collecting and articulating the interests of society which makes people look for other help, whose answers are often relied on by "figures". . Joko Widodo's emergence into the democratic arena in Indonesia is often referred to as the presence of a fair queen/satria piningit (Anas, 2014). As president, he is expected to be able to bring prosperity and justice to the Indonesian people. However, what differentiates Jokowi from previous Indonesian presidents is that Jokowi consistently has a high level of approval (approval rating) for the public even when his reign is several months long. This figure shows that the subject has not yet moved and lives up to the symbolic order that Jokowi built over two periods.

CONCLUSION

Viewing reform as anomalous encourages individuals to seek other objects they believe will provide stability and fulfillment. The fact that the populace supports Jokowi, as reflected in his high approval rating despite the regression of democracy in Indonesia, indicates a current preference for elements counter to the excesses of democracy: uncertainty, corruption, freedom, conflict, unrest, and, consequently, acceptance of repressive measures and non-democratic practices. This raises the question of whether the public will continue to desire a situation in which democracy is perceived as unusual or strange.

According to the dynamics of desire, individuals will continually replace the object that incites their desire. As a logical consequence, prolonged repression, violence, and other democratic declines will eventually reach a tipping point. When this occurs, leadership styles and public desires will shift, leading to the elimination of non-democratic actions in the future.

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